Questions on "animal rights" in a cross-national survey conducted in 1993 provide an opportunity to compare the applicability to this issue of two theories of the socio-political changes summed up in "postmodernity": Inglehart's (1997) thesis of "postmaterialist values" and Franklin's (1999) synthesis of theories of late modernity. Although Inglehar t seems not to have addressed human-nonhuman animal relations, it is reasonable to apply his theory of changing values under conditions of "existential security" to "animal rights. " Inglehar t's postmaterialism thesis argues that new values emerged within specific groups because of the achievement of material security. Although emphasizing human needs, they shift the agenda toward a series of lifestyle choices that favor extending lifestyle choices, rights, and environmental considerations. Franklin's account of nonhuman animals and modern cultures stresses a generalized "ontological insecurity." Under postmodern conditions, changes to core aspects of social and cultural life are both fragile and fugitive. As neighborhood, community, family, and friendship relations lose their normative and enduring qualities, companion animals increasingly are drawn in to those formerly exclusive human emotional spaces.With a method used by Inglehar t and a focus in countries where his postmaterialist effects should be most evident, this study derives and tests different expectations from the theories, then tests them against data from a survey supporting Inglehart's theory. His theory is not well supported. We conclude that its own anthropocentrism limits it and that the allowance for hybrids of nature-culture in Franklin's account offers more promise for a social theory of animal rights in changing times.
Our first theory is Inglehart's (1977 Inglehart's ( , 1990 Inglehart's ( , 1997 
theory of postmaterialism.
This has generated some of the most replicated results in social science, particularly in relation to values and to opinions on ecology and the environment. Although we have found no evidence that Inglehart has included human-animal relations in his analyses, other writers have claimed that his approach is applicable to them (Aslin & Norton, 1995; Jordan, 1998) . Inglehart is all the more important to introduce to scholars of human-animal relations because it has been suggested that attitudes on the environment and ecology also influence attitudes to animals (Kellert, 1985 (Kellert, , 1993 .
It is important to stress that Inglehart's theory explicitly is one of human social life; that is, it entails the a priori distinction between nature and culture so common in social theory. That provides one point of contrast with our second approach, Franklin's (1999) synthetic account of "animals and modern cultures." Franklin allows for the hybridity of nature-culture, rather than distinguishing between those analytically necessary foci. 2 We develop those differing emphases through contrasting the two writers' use of "security."
After sketching the two theories, we derive hypotheses from Inglehart's and test these against the results from the survey, using a method that Inglehart has used and focusing on countries where his postmaterialist effects should be most evident. Our results, however, do not support Inglehart's theory, an outcome we ascribe to its anthropocentric framing. Although we do not test
Franklin's theory in the same terms, we conclude that there is a need for theories of the hybridity of nature-culture, such as Franklin implies, if trends in human-animal relations are to be linked with the broader trends of postmodernization. Inglehart's (1977 Inglehart's ( , 1990 Inglehart's ( , 1997 theory of postmaterialism has been one of the most widely used and empirically supported accounts of socio-political changes over the last thirty years, and shifts in human-nonhuman animal relations have been a feature of those changes. Therefore, the theory should apply as much to this issue as to the environmentalism and value-politics where it more usually has been studied. We outline the theory here and show why it is reasonable to extend it to human-nonhuman animal relations. The theory of postmaterialism is a theory of value-change. Inglehart has argued that the new "value-orientations" among people born after World War II yield better empirical purchase in the study of political movements than the "interests" at issue in the commonly deployed class-based theories.
Postmodernity and Existential Security
Referring to "quality of life" rather than to the instrumentally economic rationality typical of modernization, "postmaterial values" arose from the conditions that liberated most people in developed countries from spending their lives on basic material demands and that opened new opportunities for self-expression and aesthetic satisfaction. Inglehart derives his case from interrelated arguments on "scarcity" and "socialization." He holds that those who grew up under relative prosperity show different value-patterns from those who grew up amid scarcity and that the orientation into which any individual is socialized remains relatively stable so long as material conditions do not change radically. His theory, that is, is one of "existential security,"
resting on "the fundamental difference between growing up with an awareness that survival is precarious, and growing up with the feeling that one's survival can be taken for granted" (Inglehart, 1997, p. 31) . Although he has found that materialism occasionally may rise in salience, as under the difficult economic conditions in Britain in the 1980s, he argues that a trend exists towards postmaterialism in all countries that are more developed. Inglehart (1997) has recently linked his postmaterialism to postmodernization, using this contested term in both its historical and conceptual senses.
Historically, he argued that while variants of modernization theory -Marxist class-based analyses or Max Weber's account of rationalization (Schluchter, 1981; Sica, 1988) -may have suited the emergence of materialism, they no longer fit present conditions. Conceptually, he contrasted the determinism, linearity, and ethnocentrism of modernization theories with his own allowance for cultural differences and with his recognition that postmaterialist values were only part of clusters of values under postmodernization; the shading of postmaterialism in a particular country, for example, varies with its religious history (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) . Even with that stress on cultural contingency, however, he has continued to find that postmaterialist values are good descriptors and predictors of change. In that case, it is reasonable to expect that the theory should apply to human-animal relations. (Aslin & Norton, 1995) . They have good reason.
The emergence and gradual acceptance of animal rights as more than a minority concern has coincided with the success of the movements for human rights and environmental responsibility, which match his theory, and animal rights has involved similar discourses. Animals have increasingly been discussed in the language of oppression, so effective in mobilizing other movements. Their homes and habitats are wantonly destroyed. They are subjected to cruel experiments, produced for meat under repressive factory systems, and hunted for sport. Unable to defend themselves against such oppression, both domesticated and wild animals have become increasingly in need.
In a sense, humans manage and control the world, and animals have become a human responsibility. More strongly, the prospect of the extinction of ever more species evokes the moral terrain of genocidal dominance. Although animal rights activists are distinctive in explicitly claiming the moral equivalence of humans and other animals, which is implicit in these discourses, their concerns are widely shared. Similarly, although these concerns were not new to the postmaterialist generations, their shift from minority positions to at least tacit acceptance in mainstream movements has coincided with the emergence of postmaterialism. Because Inglehart seems not to have followed the implications of this extension of moral inclusiveness, his social theory entails a sense of the social that is purely human.
In his account of animals in modern cultures, Franklin (1999) drew on different understandings of postmodernity and security and also implied a more inclusive sense of social. Like Inglehart, Franklin (1999) activists were so widely seen as young fanatics that he found it unimportant either to question his own assumptions, which were largely consistent with that stereotype, or to investigate the social composition of support for the issue. When, however, he treated disputes over animal rights simply as disputes over what it means to be distinctly, or properly, human, he, in effect, begged the question. The issue was the boundary between humans and animals. Animal rights activists aimed to achieve full rights for all sentient, moral subjects. To be sure, the means that some groups used contributed to their misperception. They deemed any violation of those rights to be abhorrent and demanding of extreme action. In the popular image of animal rights as a social movement, this extremism has overshadowed all else. Nevertheless, since the activists drew widespread sympathy for their concerns, if not for their means, the issue required a more nuanced and empirical analysis.
Postmodernity and Ontological Insecurity
Franklin ( Shifts in attitudes toward animals have been relatively popular and diffused (Macnaghten & Urry, 1998, pp. 66-67) .
To account for those changes, Franklin drew on the ontological insecurity that such prominent sociologists as Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992) have attributed to postmodernity. We should stress that this concept has a tangled genealogy well beyond what we can consider here. "Existential security" in Inglehart's sense refers to the certainty that basic material needs will be met.
Ontological insecurity, in the terms that Franklin adopted from Giddens (1991, p. 243) , refers to a sense of loss of continuity and order in events, including those not directly within an individual's perceptual environment. It then describes the senses of confusion, loss, unpredictability, and anxiety that many writers have attributed to the churning nature of postmodernity and that have been linked to the fragmented and fugitive character of labor markets, neighborhoods, communities, and family and domestic relations. It has been similarly applied to the privatism and social isolation of modern individuals and cultures in the West (Saunders, 1984; Marshall, Rose, Vogler & Newby, 1985 , 1987 . In so far as constant innovation in the economic order is a precondition of material gain, then existential security may necessarily generate ontological insecurity, and the seeming contradiction between it and Inglehart's existential security is then more apparent than substantive.
On that basis, Franklin (1999) argued that companionate human-animal relations -in that they fill the emotional spaces formerly met by enduring human 132 Adrian Franklin, Bruce Tranter, and Rober t White relationships -have emerged in response to widespread uncertainty,. Noting that the disruptive effects of socio-cultural change are scattered in affluent societies, he then held that the extension of moral subjecthood to animals seen in these new companionate relations should be expected to span dimensions such as education, class, gender, and age. This is consistent with the mounting body of evidence on the inclusion of companion animals as members of families (Salmon & Salmon, 1983; Albert & Bulcroft, 1988) and on the contribution of animals to human health (Wilson, 1997 Because concentration is easier to measure than diffuseness, we focus on Inglehart in our test. In the next section, we describe the data and method we used.
Data And Method
We drew our data from the responses to two statements in the 1993 International Social Science Programme Survey: "Animals should have the same moral rights that human beings do," and "It is right to use animals for medical testing if it might save human lives" (Zentralarchiv, 1995) . These questions are well suited to our purposes, even though we are making post hoc and opportunistic use of them. On our reading of Inglehart, agreement with the first should yield a strong result for postmaterialism, while agreement with the second would be more consistent with the instrumental rationality of materialism. Trends in responses to the two questions should then provide a degree of internal checking.
We have restricted our analysis to 6 of the 21 countries included in the survey. Since Inglehart has found that postmaterial effects are strongest in richer
Explaining Support for Animal Rightscountries, we selected the United States, West Germany, and Japan. For contrast, we added Bulgaria, from the former Eastern Bloc, and the Philippines, as a developing country. Finally, because an Australian study has shown that the data generally support Inglehart's thesis (Bean, 1998) 
Analyses
The full results of the analyses are in Tables 1 and 2 . Since both tables show the expected differences between men and women -with the exception of Table 1 shows mean scores and measures of association for the first dependent variable ("Animals should have the same moral rights that human beings do") with larger mean scores indicating more agreement with the statement.
Value-orientations have very little impact on the dependent variable in
Australia, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and the United States. Inglehart's schema would not be expected to be applicable in Bulgaria and the Philippines, but it is striking that the differences between materialists and postmaterialists are slight in the affluent Australia and the United States. The effect is somewhat stronger in Japan and in West Germany, where it is significant, but the beta coefficients show that values are less important in West Germany than age
Explaining Support for Animal Rightsor sex and no more important than sex in Japan. The pattern in age is just as striking. It is all but uniformly U-shaped rather than having the linear trend expected under Inglehart's model. In Australia, Japan, and West Germany, where postmaterial effects should be strong, support for animals' moral rights is highest among the oldest cohorts. In the other three countries, there is an upturn in support. Although the beta coefficients show that age is a relatively strong predictor in most countries, its effects do not follow Inglehart's pattern. Finally, in all but the less affluent Bulgaria and the Philippines, tertiary education tends to lower support for the moral rights of animals rather than to raise it, as would be expected from Inglehart's thesis.
5 Table 2 shows the results for the second dependent variable, "It is right to use animals for medical testing if it might save human lives." Values is a good predictor for Bulgaria, Japan, and West Germany -where it has either the strongest or second strongest impact -but is weak for Australia, the Philippines, and the United States. Age again has a relatively strong effect in all six countries. In all but the United States, however, the oldest cohort goes against the roughly linear trend. The effect of education also runs directly counter to expectations.
Finally, the multiple R-squared statistics show that only a small amount of the variance in both dependent variables is explained by values, age, education, and sex combined. In Table 1 , the results range from 1.1% for the Philippines to 7.5% for the United States and, in 
Discussion
Although we have given Inglehart every advantage by including the affluent countries where his postmaterial effects should be strongest and by choosing data, variables, and a method -all of which have been used to support him -we still found little backing for his theory and more trends counter to it. Support for the extension of animal rights is substantially established in all six countries -startlingly so. In all, however, that support is spread among all age groups and among those with materialist as well as postmaterialist orientations. Rather than the expected concentration of support from tertiary educated people, we found the opposite. With more than 90% of variance left unexplained in Tables 1 and 2 , Inglehart's allowance for the cultural contingencies, which are certainly evident here, carries a lot of weight. Because his thesis is well supported on other issues -if the link we drew from it to animal rights is granted -there must be something specific to this issue that is discrepant with the theory.
We argue that this is given by the framing of postmaterialism, in that the crossing of species-boundaries in the assumption of moral equivalence is at odds with its anthropocentric focus. Since Franklin's case for diffuseness better fits our results, we develop that point by returning to the difference between his and Inglehart's versions of postmodernization.
We originally contrasted the two theories by noting the different emphases in Inglehart's existential security and Franklin's ontological insecurity, and we now observe that these opposite responses to security imply different a priori assumptions over human-animal relations. Inglehart takes an anthropocentric stance. In effect, he claimed a distinct human nature, deriving his axiom of "scarcity" from Maslow's "hierarchy of needs," in which full humanness is said to result from the transcendence of physiological, or animal, needs.
To repeat, Inglehart's postmaterialist thesis argues that new values emerge as a result of material security. Although these values drive the acceptance of lifestyle variations, the extension of rights to others, and the need for environmentalism, they still are human-centered. what we found in our analyses, it tends to be associated with less, rather than more, education (Cartmill, 1993 Although quantitative study along these lines would be revealing, it also would need to be supplemented with comparative ethnographic investigation -where the ethnos under study was not restricted from the start to humans. We also have left difficulties unresolved. The distinction between anthropocentrism and misanthropic zoocentrism, for example, remains prob-lematic. As the discrepant figures in our internal check suggest, people find ways of reconciling orientations that initially seem mutually exclusive.
All that requires further study. For the moment, we hold that the points of difference we have raised and shown here indicate the issues that need to be addressed in a broad sociology of human-animal relations. Any number of theories and methods might be brought to the study of how the social conditions of postmodernity affect the practical settlement of apparently contradictory demands in humans' relations with nonhuman others. But if these are anthropocentric from the start or if nature and culture are treated in them as categorically distinct, they will not be adequate to the complexity of humananimal relations under postmodernity. Our use of the phrase 'hybridity of nature-culture' follows that of writers in science and technology studies (Latour, 1991) . It refers to the claim that the natural world and the human world are not separate but intertwined, mixed-up and implicated together in historical processes and cultural artifacts. It is not possible therefore to speak of human cultures as categorically separate and separable from the natural world (animals and other natural objects) in the way that is customary in both natural and social science.
in these analyses were collected in Australia between December 1993 and October 1994 (n = 1779), in Bulgaria in March 1994 (n = 1183), West Germany in July 1993
(n = 1140), Japan from November to December 1992 (n = 1305), the Philippines in December 1993 (n = 1200) and the USA from February to April 1993 (n = 1157).
5
This pattern for education is consistent with such analyses of income as were possible. Controlling for other independent variables, we found higher income earners more likely than those on lower incomes to disagree that animals have the same moral rights as humans in Australia, the United States, and West Germany. We also found that higher income earners were more likely than lower income earners to agree that animals should be used for medical testing in these three countries. In both instances income and the dependent variables were associated in a linear fashion. The Bulgarian data showed no clear relationship between income and attitudes toward animal rights, or the medical testing of animals.
